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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the standard enunciated in Norton to the factual situations in
this case.
Mr. Justice Goldberg in his dissenting opinion states that
the Court went beyond its holding in the Norton decision. He
indicated that Norton would require immunity for all the Pon-
tiac and Oldsmobile sales and also for those sales of parts and
Chevrolets which were not connected with a Seattle warehouse
or office. But this argument ignores the fact that GM, through
its activities in Washington, has just as permanently established
itself in the state, as it would have through establishing a local
office as in the Norton case. It is also Justice Goldberg's belief
that the activities of GM's representatives were comparable to
the activities of itinerant drummers or traveling salesmen which
have been held immune from state taxation. 40 It is submitted
that this argument ignores the distinguishing facts that the
"district managers" were permanently established in the state
and were engaged in a broad range of activities to aid in the
stimulation of GM sales.
The Court in deciding this case properly directed its inquiry
toward determining whether the bundle of in-state activity of
the taxpayer which produced the sales was a sufficient con-
nection with Washington to support the tax. The Court should
have gone further, however, and related the tax to the protec-
tion, opportunities, and benefits given by the state levying the
tax. But until a final determination by Congress concerning
what state taxation of interstate commerce will be permissible,
the Supreme Court must decide the constitutionality of state
taxation of interstate commerce on a case-by-case basis. In
this case the Court was justified in upholding the tax.
Lawrence L. Jones
CRIMINAL LAW -IMPOSSIBLE ATTEMPTS"
A thief, captured with a stolen overcoat, cooperated with
Oklahoma police in entrapping the defendant by delivering the
coat to him. There was no question as to the defendant's intent
40. For cases relied on by Justice Goldberg, see McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth,
322 U.S. 327 (1944); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489(1887).
[Vol. XXVI
NOTES
in receiving the coat, as he clearly believed it to be stolen. Defend-
ant was convicted for "attempt to receive stolen goods," but on
appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeal reversed. Held,
a person could not be guilty of an "attempt to receive stolen
goods"' where the goods he received were no longer stolen prop-
erty. Booth v. State, 398 P.2d 863 (Okla. Crim. App. 1965).
A person may fail to commit a crime but still be liable for a
criminal attempt. If he fails because he is physically interrupted
in his planned course of action, it is generally held that he is
liable for a criminal attempt. Problems have arisen, however,
when the actor completes his planned course of action, but the
act does not constitute the intended crime. Simple illustrations
of such a case are the attempt to pick an empty pocket and the
attempt to kill someone already dead. It is this type of attempt,
termed "impossible attempt," which is the subject of this paper.
The courts have struggled with the problem for nearly a cen-
tury, with the result that most jurisdictions today draw a dis-
tinction between factual impossibility and legal impossibility. A
factually impossible attempt has been defined as one that fails
because some factual or physical condition unknown to the de-
fendant makes it impossible to complete the intended crime, for
example, trying to pick an empty pocket. A legally impossible
attempt is one in which the act when fully consummated does
not meet the legal requirements of the intended crime, for ex-
ample, "stealing" one's own umbrella.2 Under the majority
Anglo-American view conviction will depend upon whether the
defendant's attempt can be classified as a factual impossibility;
no conviction will lie if the attempt is classified as a legal im-
possibility.
1. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 42 (1951) : "Every person who attempts to com-
mit a crime, and in such attempt does any act toward the commission of such
crime, but fails, or is prevented or interrupted in the perpetration thereof . .. ."
Id. § 1713: "Every person who buys or receives, in any manner, upon any con-
sideration, any personal property of any value whatever that has been stolen,
embezzled, obtained by false pretense or robbery, knowing or having reasonable
cause to believe the same to have been stolen, embezzled, obtained by false pre-
tense or robbery, or who conceals, withholds, or aids in concealing or withholding
such property from the owner . ..."
2. See Booth v. State, 398 P.2d 863, 870 (Okla. Crim. App. 1965). See also
CLARK, CRIMINAL LAw 146 (3d ed. 1915) : "If a person attempts to do something
which, even if his purpose is accomplished, will not be crime in law, he is not
guilty of a criminal attempt, though he may think he will commit a crime."
See also PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 494 (1957), wherein the author states that
the legal impossibility doctrine boils down to this: "Attempting to do what is
not a crime is not attempting to commit a crime."
1966]
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Originally the English courts refused to convict in any case
of impossible attempt. In Regina v. Collins,3 the court took the
view that a man who placed his hand into an empty pocket could
not be convicted of attempting to steal. Speaking for the court,
Baron Bramwell concluded: "We think that an attempt to com-
mit a felony can only be made out when, if no interruption had
taken place, the attempt could have been carried out success-
fully."' 4 In order to emphasize his position, Bramwell supposed
situations where a man might attempt to steal his umbrella, or
strike a deadly blow at a block of wood believing it to be man,
or enter an empty room with intent to steal.5 The absurdity
of conviction in these situations apparently convinced him of
the soundness of his decision. This extreme view was later re-
jected by the English courts in Regina v. Ring,6 and, after vari-
ous developments, the present distinction between legal and fac-
tual impossibility7 was established.
The leading American case is People v. Jaffe,8 which held
that it was not a criminal attempt to receive goods believed to
be stolen when in fact they were not, classifying the attempt as
legally impossible. Other cases which have been held legally
impossible attempts are: attempt to shoot a deer out of season,
when in fact the "deer" was a stuffed skin ;9 attempt to bribe
a juror who was not a juror ;1o attempt to commit subornation
of perjury where the testimony would have been immaterial to
the case ;11 attempt by a public official to contract illegally for
a valid debt when the debt was unauthorized and a nullity.12
3. Le. & Ca. 471, 169 Eng. Rep. 1477 (Ex. 1864).
4. As reported in 9 Cox C.C. 497, 499 (Ex. 1864).
5. Id. at 498.
6. 17 Cox C.C. 491, 61 L.J.M.C. 116, 66 L.T.(N.S.) 306 (1892).
7. The French during this period of development tried unsuccessfully to clas-
sify impossible attempts as "absolute" or "relative," a dichotomy basically similar
to the majority position in America today. For examples of each classification
see HALT, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMiNAL LAW 121 (1957). Hall describes this system
of classification as an "intermediate view" between the extremes of punishing all
the attempts and the earlier view of refusing to punish any impossible attempts.
8. 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906).
9. State v. Guffey, 362 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. App. 1953).
10. State v. Taylor, 345 Mo. 325, 133 S.W.2d 336 (1939).
11. People v. Teal, 196 N.Y. 372, 89 N.E. 1086 (1909).
12. Marley v. State, 58 N.J.L. 207, 33 Atl. 208 (1895). For other cases
following the Jaffe decision see People v. Werner, 16 Cal. 2d 216, 105 P.2d 927
(1940) ; People v. Schroeder, 132 Cal. App. 2d 1, 281 P.2d 297 (1955) ; People
v. Zimmerman, 11 Cal. App. 115, 104 Pac. 590 (1909) ; People v. Jelke, 1 N.Y.S.2d
321, 152 N.Y.S.2d 479, 135 N.E.2d 213 (1956) ; People v. Rollino, 37 Misc. 2d
14, 233 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1962) ; People v. Finkelstein, 21 Misc. 2d 723, 197 N.Y.S.2d
31 (1960).
(Vol. XXVI
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Typical of decisions based on factual impossibility are those
holding that the picking of an empty pocket is a criminally
punishable attempt.1 Likewise, a defendant who shot into his
intended victim's bed, believing him there when in fact he was
elsewhere, was guilty of attempted murder.14 It has been held
no defense to "attempted abortion" that the woman was not
pregnant. 5 Other examples of factually impossible attempts
are: attempted shooting of someone with an empty gun, 16 at-
tempted stealing from an empty receptacle ;17 attempted rape by
an impotent defendant.'"
The legal impossibility doctrine is not accepted in all Ameri-
can jurisdictions. In 1959, for example, California abandoned
the Jaffe rationale and the defense of legal impossibility in
People v. Camodeca'9 and in People v. Rojas.20 The American
Law Institute has also decided against the legal impossibility
doctrine. The Model Penal Code article 5.01 provides in part:
"A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if acting
with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission
of the crime he: (a) purposely engages in conduct which would
constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances were as he
believes them to be."' 2'
In Louisiana, as in Oklahoma, attempts are made criminal
under a general attempt article2 which must be read with the
13. See Commonwealth v. McDonald, 5 Cush. 365 (Mass. 1850); People v.
Jones, 46 Mich. 441, 9 N.W. 486 (1881).
14. State v. Mitchell, 170 Mo. 633, 71 S.W. 175 (1902).
15. Commonwealth v. Tibbetts, 157 Mass. 519, 32 N.E. 910 (1893) ; People
v. Huff, 339 Ill. 328, 171 N.E. 261 (1930).
16. State v. Damms, 9 Wis. 2d 183, 100 N.W.2d 592 (1960).
17. Clark v. State, 86 Tenn. 511, 8 S.W. 145 (1888).
18. Hunt v. State, 114 Ark. 239, 169 S.W. 773 (1914); State v. Ballamak,
28 N.M. 212, 210 Pac. 391 (1922).
19. 52 Cal. 2d 142, 338 P.2d 903 (1959), involving attempted theft by false
pretenses where the intended victim was not deceived.
20. 55 Cal. 2d 252, 358 P.2d 921 (1961).
21. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
"(1) Definition of Attempt
"A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind
of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime he:
"(a) purposely engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if the
attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or
"(b) when causing a particular result in an element of the crime, does or
omits to do anything with the purpose of causing or with the -belief that it will
cause such result without further conduct on his part; or
"(c) purposely does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances
as he believes them to be, is a substantial step in a course of conduct planned
to culminate in his commission of the crime."
22. LA. R.S. 14:27 (1950) : "Any person who, having a specific intent to
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
article proscribing the crime in question. In none of its terms
does the attempt article refer to a distinction between legal or
factual impossibility. It does provide, however, that "it shall be
immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have
accomplished his purpose. ' 23 In the Comments under the article
the Reporters added: "It is immaterial whether there is an actual
possibility of committing the intended offense. '2 4 (Emphasis
added.) There follows an apparent reference to legal impossi-
bility: "The test appears to be . . . would the defendant have
been guilty of a crime if his intention had been fully consum-
mated. ' 25 Under article 69, "Receiving Stolen Things," 2 how-
ever, the Reporters commented: "[I]f a trap were set for a
suspected receiver of stolen things, and he actually took some
'planted' goods into his possession, the circumstance that the
goods were not in fact stolen goods would be a defense. How-
ever, the individual in question would possibly be guilty of an
attempt to receive stolen things. ' 2 No Louisiana case has de-
cided the question of legal impossibility, and the comment by the
Reporters does not squarely meet the issue.
The instant case was one of first impression in Oklahoma.
The facts were directly in line with Jaffe, which had approved
the legal impossibility doctrine, and with Rojas, which had re-
jected the doctrine. The decision to apply the doctrine was in-
fluenced by the decision of another Oklahoma court giving
recognition to the doctrine.2 Although forced to admit the many
inconsistencies in the application of the legal impossibility dis-
tinction, the court blamed them on mistakes in applying the doc-
trine, rather than on the doctrine itself. The court pointed out
that the Camodeca case, which departed from the line of Cali-
fornia cases supporting the Jaffa decision, actually represented
a case of factual rather than legal impossibility. The court could
not deny, however, that the Rojas case, following Camodeca, was
commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly
toward the accomplishment of his object.
23. Ibid.
24. Id. Reporter's Comment.
25. Ibid.
26. Id. 14:69: "Receiving stolen things is the intentional procuring, receiving,
or concealing of anything of value which has been the subject of any robbery or
theft, under circumstances which indicate that the offender knew or had good
reason to believe that the thing was the subject of one of these offenses."
27. Id. Reporter's Comment.
28. Nemecek v. State, 72 Okla. Crim. 195, 114 P.2d 492 (1941).
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directly in point with the instant case, and was thus a case of
legal impossiblity.
The court also faced a serious problem in the language of the
Oklahoma statute which required knowledge on the part of the
defendant that the goods were stolen. The court was uncertain
how one could know property was stolen when in fact it was
not and concluded that it was dealing with a case of legal im-
possibility because the act of receiving the coat was not criminal.
Much has been written explaining impossible attempts, both
in favor of and in opposition to the majority view.29 It has been
stated that the present jurisprudence supporting the legal im-
possibility doctrine relies on the "crucial fallacy" that "because
the intended harm could not be accomplished, none occurred." 80
It also is argued that the underlying reason why courts have
avoided the extremes of holding no impossible attempt to be
criminal and of holding all such attempts to be criminal is that
some attempts carry with them a great probability of harm be-
cause they carry a great probability of accomplishment; yet as
to other attempts, the chances of accomplishment and therefore
of harm are so remote that it would seem unreasonable to con-
demn them as criminal.81
The court in the Camodeca case avoided the "crucial fallacy"
when it stated: "One of the purposes of the criminal law is to
protect society from those who intend to injure it. When it. is
established that the defendant intended to commit a specific
crime and that in carrying out his intention he committed an
act that caused harm or sufficient danger of harm, it is imma-
terial that for some collateral reason he could not complete the
intended crime." (Emphasis added.)
29. Arnold, Criminal Attempts -- The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction, 40
YALE L.J. 53 (1930); Curran, Criminal and Non-Criminal Attempts, 19 GEO.
L.J. 185, 316 (1931) ; Keedy, Criminal Attempts at Common Law, 102 U. PA. L.
REV. 464 (1954) ; Ryu, Contemporary Problems of Criminal Attempts, 32 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1170 (1957) ; Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 HARv. L. REV. 821 (1928)
Smith, Two Problems in Criminal Attempts, 70 HARv. L. REV. 422 (1957)
Strahorn, Jr., The Effect of Impossibility on Criminal Attempts, 78 U. PA. L.
REV. 962 (1930).
30. See HALL, PRINCIPLES OF CRImiNAL LAW 128 (1957).
31. Id. at 124.
32. People v. Camodeca, 52 Cal. 2d 142, 147, 338 P.2d 903, 906 (1959). The
court continued: "Although the law does not impose punishment for guilty intent
alone, it does impose punishment when guilty intent is coupled with action that
would result in a crime but for the intervention of some fact or circumstance
unknown to the defendant."
1966]
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The court in the instant case was forced to admit that "what
is a 'legal impossibility' as distinguished from a 'physical or fac-
tual impossibility' has over a long period of time perplexed our
courts and has resulted in many irreconcilable decisions." 8 And
the court strongly recommended that article 5.01 of the Model
Penal Code be adopted, so as to abrogate the doctrine of a legal
impossibility. The force of this reasoning is easily illustrated.
Assuming that the purpose of the legal impossibility doctrine is
to draw a line between the absurd attempt and the more realistic
attempt, it is submitted that the doctrine fails both theoretically
and practically. Factual impossibility cases can be supposed, and
have actually arisen, which are as absurd as any imaginable
legal impossibility case, though, like legal impossibility cases,
never completely devoid of the prospect of harm; for example,
attempted murder with a voodoo charm ;84 attempted poisoning
with a ridiculously insufficient dose,85 or even a non-poisonous
substance; attempted rape by an impotent man;80 attempted
theft from an empty house.8 7 Stating that the legal impossibility
doctrine is designed to avoid an absurd result is equivalent to
asserting that the legal impossibility doctrine is designed to
avoid those attempts which do not carry with them a reasonable
probability of harm, and such a purpose is indeed a valid and
proper one. But since the doctrine fails in this purpose, it is
questionable why the doctrine should be inserted into this al-
ready complex area, especially when the basic reason for con-
demning some attempts and exculpating others can easily serve
as an effective test. It should suffice to look to the presence
of the criminal intent and to the probability of harm.88
Theoretically, the test approved by the court in the instant
33. 398 P.2d at 870, where the court also said: "Detailed discussion of the
subject is unnecessary to make it clear that it is frequently most difficult to
compartmentalize a particular set of facts as coming within one of the categories
rather than the other."
34. See The Attorney General v. Willem, 2 H. & C. 431, 159 Eng. Rep. 178
(Ex. 1863); and State v. Clarissa, 11 Ala. 57 (1847).
35. Rex v. White, 2 K.B. 124 (1910).
36. State v. Damms, 9 Wis. 2d 183, 100 N.W.2d 592 (1960).
37. State v. Utley, 82 N.C. 556 (1880). See also People v. Jones, 46 Mich.
441, 9 N.W.486 (1881), where an attempt to pick an empty pocket was held
factually impossible. But if the defendant had picked a pocket and recovered
his own wallet, the cases seem to indicate that such an attempt would be held
legally impossible. There seems to be little justification for this distinction.
38. See Smith, Two Problems in Criminal Attempts, 70 HARV. L. REv. 422
(1957), wherein the author expresses much the same idea when he speaks of the
need to punish extreme recklessness, such as attempt to poison with an insufficient
dose.
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case is extremely weak. According to the court's test one must
assume that the defendant's act is completed as he intended it,
and then if this completed act does not constitute a crime, his
attempt cannot be criminal. The fallacy lies in the assumption.
If, indeed, one assumes that the defendant's intended act is com-
pleted, it is necessary to assume not only that the physical act
is completed but also that the circumstances are as the defendant
believed them to be and the consequences of his action are as he
intended. The defendant's physical act was not the act he in-
tended, yet the court was willing to equate the two in applying
the test. To apply the test properly one should assume that the
defendant in the instant case received, not simply goods, but sto-
len goods. And, further, if he had done what he intended, re-
ceived a stolen coat, he would indeed be guilty of a crime. Thus
the test adopted by the court in Booth to find a legal impossi-
bility, if applied correctly, is a mere effort in futility, for proper
application eliminates completely the distinction for which the
test was formulated. It is therefore submitted that the similar
test suggested by the Reporters under the Louisiana general
attempt article should not be used, as it too is worthless if cor-
rectly applied. It is further submitted that the legal impossi-
bility distinction contradicts the clear language of the Louisiana
attempt article.
The Louisiana attempt article is similar to the Oklahoma at-
tempt article except for the important added statement: "It shall
be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he completed
an act different from the act he intended." 89 This is a clear and
emphatic declaration that all impossible attempts are to be
treated as indictable attempts in Louisiana, whether they be
classified as legally impossible or factually impossible. Thus, by
the certain language of article 27, it is submitted that the legal
impossibility doctrine, with all of its difficulties and irration-
alities, should find no place in Louisiana jurisprudence.
With the possible limited exception of those cases (more
theoretical than practical) where the probability of harm is so
slight that the criminal intent itself amounts to an absurdity,
the broad, clear language of article 27 should be accorded its
full scope. The unduly guarded language of the Reporter's
Comment under article 69 suggests that such an application
39. LA. R.S. 14:27 (1950).
1966] NOTES 433
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of article 27 is "possible," and the experience of other jurisdic-
tions indicates that such an application is highly desirable.
Billy J. Tauzin
OBLIGATIONS- OFFER MADE IN NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENT
Defendant advertised in a local newspaper:
"OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS
"WE WANT enthusiastic, ambitious men to rep-
resent us locally, Professional training program
w/$450.00 monthly guarantee if qualified. En-
thusiasm and ambition quickly rewarded with ad-
vancement. Be in the four figure bracket. For ap-
pointment call Mr. Johnson, 357-9756 before 1 p.m.
daily."1
In response to the advertisement, plaintiff applied for employ-
ment and was hired as a salesman. After receiving commissions
of $171.84 for the first month and $417.61 for the second, plain-
tiff resigned, and brought suit for $300.00, which he considered
the balance due under his contract at $450.00 per month, less
commissions paid. Defendant urged that the newspaper ad-
vertisement was merely an invitation to the prospective employee
to make an offer and enter into a contract of employment. The
lower court sustained the plaintiff's claim, and on appeal the
First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed. Held, the newspaper
advertisement constituted an offer, which, upon acceptance,
formed a binding contract containing the terms of the advertise-
ment. Willis v. Allied Insulation Co., 174 So. 2d 858 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1965).
The Louisiana Civil Code provides four requirements for a
valid contract: (1) legal capacity to contract, (2) a certain
object, (3) a lawful purpose, and (4) consent legally given.2
Consent, defined as "the concurrence of intention in two or more
persons, with regard to a matter understood by all, reciprocally
communicated, and resulting in each party from a free and de-
1. Willis v. Allied Insulation Co., 174 So. 2d 858, 860 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1965).
2. LA. CiviL CODE art. 1779 (1870).
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